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Abstract
We study the real business cycles in China between 1954-2006, and examine
the changes after China’s market-oriented reforms starting in 1978. We overcome
some data problems and find that the economic volatility is generally moderated
after 1978. However, the relative volatility of each variable to output diverges.
We undertake a neo-classical approach to investigate factors that can drive the fea-
tures of long-term fluctuations and the differences between the pre-1978 and the
post-1978 periods. We find that TFP process can explain the main features of fluc-
tuations and the general moderation but not the relative volatility changes. We
show that policy changes in government expenditure can account for the relative
volatility divergency. Counterfactual experiments are also provided to discover the
role of each factor in explaining the long-term fluctuation features in China.
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1 Introduction
China’s high economic growth has attracted the world’s attention. In particular, after
China started its market-oriented economic reforms in 1978, the average annual GNP
growth rate reached 9% between 1978 and 2006. Nevertheless, business cycles and
economic fluctuations in China are rarely studied although they are important issues.
Moreover, studies on China usually suffer from problems in data availability and con-
sistency. Therefore, the long-term features of Chinese business cycles are still not well
understood in the literature. Since the 1978 reform significantly affected China’s growth,
it is natural to ask whether the reform had impacts on economic fluctuations. In this pa-
per, we first make our effort to improve the business cycle measurement of China and
discover the long-term features of Chinese real business cycles from 1954 to 2006 and
the differences between the pre-1978 and the post-1978 periods. We find that economic
fluctuations were significantly moderated after 1978. However, the pattern of relative
volatility of each variable to output diverged. Particularly, relative volatility of house-
hold consumption became much higher while that of private investment became much
lower after 1978.
To further understand the business cycle features, we adopt the standard approach of
real business cycle research.1 We use neo-classical growth models to study the factors
that can generate the long-term economic fluctuations in China and the differences be-
tween the pre-1978 (1954- 1977) and the post-1978 (1978-2006) periods. Our baseline
model with population growth , technology growth and TFP shocks successfully ex-
plains the moderation of volatility after 1978. The counterfactual experiments also indi-
cate that the TFP growth rates (productivity changes) are the main reason for the moder-
ation in China’s economic volatility. However, these factors cannot explain the relative
volatility changes. We suggest that the policy changes in government expenditure may
account for the changes in relative volatility. We study the government expenditure pro-
cess and find a significant policy pattern change between the pre-1978 and post-1978
periods. Both the government consumption and government investment processes in the
pre-1978 period were significantly pro-cyclical, but they became counter-cyclical in the
post-1978 period. In addition, we find the expenditure allocation between government
consumption and government investment was reversed in the post-1978 period. We then
extend the model to incorporate the government expenditure process. We show that the
changes in fiscal policies help to explain the relative volatility changes.
Our first task in this paper, probably the most difficult, is to collect and manage the
data for studying the real business cycle features in China. We face several problems of
1Rebelo (2005) provides a detailed survey of real business cycles research.
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data. For example, 1) there are no direct statistics for consumer durables; 2) the data of
employment are not consistent over time; 3) the data of labor hours are very limited; 4)
the classification of consumption category and the consumer price index are not consis-
tent over time. To keep the measurement of Chinese business cycles consistent to the
real business cycle literature, we need to do calculation and estimation by ourselves, and
adjust the corresponding changes to every related economic variable.2
Our study shows that the economic fluctuations have been largely moderated since
1978. Compared with the volatility in the pre-1978 period, the volatility of output de-
creased by 78%, consumption decreased by 60%, investment decreased by 83%, and
employment decreased by 84% in the post-1978 period.3 We also find that, although
the volatility was in general moderated, the consumption became more volatile relative
to the output in the post-1978 period. The relative volatility of consumption increased
from 55% in the pre-1978 to 102% in the post-1978.4 Meanwhile, the relative volatility
of investment decreased from 276% in the pre-1978 to 217% in the post-1978.5
To further understand the long-term economic fluctuations in China, we first use a
standard neo-classical growth model with population growth , technology growth and
TFP shocks, which is widely used in the real business cycle literature.6 We estimate
the growth and shock factors separately for the pre-1978 and the post-1978 periods, and
keep all other calibrated parameters the same across the two periods. We find that this
standard model can explain the main statistical features of Chinese business cycles well.
It also successfully generates the moderation of volatility in the post-1978 economy.
However, the model cannot explain the relative volatility changes - in the model econ-
omy, the relative volatility of every variable does not change much from the pre-1978 to
the post-1978 economy.
We suggest that government expenditure is a reason for the relative volatility changes.
With an analysis of China’s government expenditure, we find that there is a significant
policy change after 1978. In the pre-1978 period, both government consumption and
investment were significantly and positively correlated with the pervious period pro-
2For example, the adjustment of consumption durables will affect the values of consumption, invest-
ment, capital stock, output and the estimation of TFP.
3We also estimate the average work hours for the post-1978 period. Taking into account the volatility
of work hours, total labor hours would be more volatile. However, we do not have work hour data for the
pre-1978 period. If we assume that work hours were constant in the pre-78 period because of the socialism
planning economy, then the decrease in labor volatility becomes 8%.
4The relative volatility of household consumption increased from 53% in the pre-1978 to 103% in the
post-1978
5The relative volatility of non-government investment decreased from 375% in the pre-1978 to 277% in
the post-1978.
6For example, Hansen (1985).
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ductivity (TFP). However, in the post-1978 period, both government consumption and
government investment were negatively correlated with the pervious period productivity.
We also apply econometric methods to estimate the processes of government consump-
tion and investment. The results also confirm our data analysis.
The pattern change in government expenditure indicates that the Chinese fiscal pol-
icy was pro-cyclical between 1954 and 1977, and became counter-cyclical from 1978
to 2006. In addition, the expenditure allocation between government consumption and
government investment was reversed in the post-1978 period – government consump-
tion increased to more than 60% as of total government expenditure from 40% in the
pre-1978 period. We extend the baseline model to incorporate government consumption
and government investment. We characterize government consumption and investment
into the model as shock processes in addition to the TFP shocks. Our simulation shows
that the addition of government expenditure helps to explain the relative changes in
volatility.
It is necessary to note that because data of work hours are very limited, to provide
consistent comparison between the pre-1978 and post-1978 periods, we focus employ-
ment fluctuations rather than fluctuations of labor hours in the main text.7 In the ap-
pendix, we use the limited observations to estimate the hours worked in the post-1978
period and redo the analysis with the estimated labor hours. The estimated labor hours
are more volatile than employment. We find that our analysis results are still preserved
except that the model can not generate a comparable labor volatility as that we estimated.
There are few related studies on Chinese business cycles. We briefly describe them
here. Zhang and Wan (2005) studies China’s business cycles of 1985 - 2000 by using a
VAR approach based on an AD-AS model. Gao (2007) uses a business cycle accounting
approach to study China’s economic fluctuations between 1978 and 2006, and suggests
that efficiency wedge are the main source driving fluctuations. The two studies both
suggest that government policies did not play an important role of generating fluctua-
tions. However, this paper, which extends the analysis to the period prior 1978, suggests
that government expenditure is important in explaining the relative volatility differences
between the pre-1978 and the post-1978 periods. Imai (1996) studies China’s business
cycles in a longer period from 1955 - 94 that covers years prior to 1978 as us. Because
the GDP data was not available when the author did the research, calculation of an-
nual economic growth rates were based on net material product. The author also found
a significant moderation in output volatility after 1978 although the paper focused on
identifying each cycle in the studied period. We use a neoclassical approach to analyze
7The data of hours worked before 1978 are not available at all. Some data are available for 1991 – 98
and 2001 – 06.
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China’s economic fluctuations through the postwar period. A similar approach is also
used by Otsu (2008) to analyze Korea’s economic crisis in the most recent literature.
The author also faced a highly volatile consumption process relative to output process,
and suggested that the GHH preference and interest rate shocks can account for it.8 We,
however, suggest that government fiscal polices can help to explain the high consump-
tion volatility relative to output.
Regarding the effects of government expenditure on household consumption, Gali
et al. (2007) show that government expenditure has an crowding-in effect on private
consumption with a New Keynesian Model. Some empirical studies, e.g. Blanchard
and Perotti (2002) using the US data, support this proposition. On the other hand, Rossi
(2007), Coenen et al. (2007) and Horvath (2009) do not show supportive results with
the Keynesian framework. In this paper, we show that the crowding out effect of gov-
ernment expenditure on consumption in a neo-classical envelopment is consistent with
the business cycle features in the Chinese economy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and our
estimation. Section 3 presents the stylized facts of the Chinese real business cycles, and
provides a comparison between the pre- and post-1978 periods. A comparison between
China and the other economies is also provided for reference. Section 4 describes the
baseline model, calibration, and the simulation results. Section 5 provides an analysis on
China’s government expenditure process, and extends the model to examine the effects
of the government expenditure. The quantitative results and a discussion of the effects
of government expenditure are also presented in this section. Section 6 performs coun-
terfactual experiments to understand the role of each factor in explaining the economic
fluctuations. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Data
We obtain data from various sources and do crosscheck among them. Most data are col-
lected from Data of Gross domestic Product of China 1952-2004. Data of employment
and labor hours are also acquired from annual issues of China Labor Statistics Yearbook
(CLSY). The most recent national account data in 2005 and 2006 are obtained from the
2006 and 2007 issues of China Statistical Yearbook (CSY). The above are all published
by the National Statistical Bureau (NSB) of P.R.C. We collect fiscal data from annual
issues of the Finance Yearbook of China (FYC) published by Ministry of Finance. To
keep the measurement of Chinese business cycles consistent to the real business cycle
8See Greenwood et al. (1988) for the GHH preference.
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literature, we need to do calculation and estimation by ourselves, and adjust the corre-
sponding changes to every related economic variable. Because many statistics are not
consistent over time or with different sources, adjustment is needed. We have talked to
Chinese statistical officials to find out the reasons for the inconsistency to make adequate
adjustment.
2.1 Output, Consumption, and investment
We obtain the GDP data from DGDPC and CSY. NSB also provides GNP at current
price for years after 1978. Since China traded little with the rest of the world before the
reform in 1978, the GNP would be very close the GDP during the pre-1978 period. We
estimate the real GDP at price of year 2000 with GDP deflator.
To be consistent with the growth theory, we adjust the consumption, investment and
output from the original data as follows:
Y = Yo (original data)+Y g+Y d; (1)
Ch =Co (original data)+Y g+Y d− Id; (2)
C =Ch+G; (3)
I p = Io (original data)+ Id; (4)
I = I p+ Ig; (5)
where Y is aggregate output, Y g is service provided by government capital, Y d is service
provided by consumer durables. C is aggregate consumption, including household con-
sumption Ch and government consumption G, Id is consumption on consumer durables,
I p is private (or non-government) investment, and Ig is government investment.
We derive nominal government consumption from the national account and the nom-
inal government investment Ig from government expenditure under the construction ac-
count of its budget. The nominal government consumption and government investment
are then converted to 2000 yuan using the estimated consumption deflator and invest-
ment deflator, respectively. The remaining of the investment is the measured private
(non-government) investment.
2.2 Consumer durables (Id)
Consumption on durables is classified in investment. Estimating the consumer durables
is a daunting task. In the literature, no one has ever estimated the consumer durables
for China. Items we include in consumer durables are daily article durables, entertain-
ment durables, transport equipment and telecommunication equipment of all residents
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and urban households’ consumption on construction and decoration materials. The rural
households’ consumption on construction and decoration materials is not included be-
cause rural residents in China often construct houses by themselves, the expenditure on
construction and decoration materials is counted in the residential investment in national
accounts already.
We first estimate the urban households’ consumption on durables. CSY provides
the data of per capita consumption on daily article durables and entertainment durables
from 1986 through 2006, but construction and decoration materials are only available
from 1985 to 1991. For the rest, CSY only provides aggregated data of their upper
categories. Fortunately, CSY provides consumer price index (CPI) for all categories and
sub-categories from 1985 to 2006. Before 1985 CPI data are not available, and we use
retail price index (RPI) instead. The price index information can be used to estimate
the weights of each durable good. For instance, the category of housing from 1994
through 2000 contains two subcategories-rent and construction materials. We would
like to estimate the expenditure on construction materials, but only the expenditure on
housing is available. Because price of housing (Ph) is the weighted average of price of
rent (Pr) and price of construction (Pc), we can have the equation:
Ph = w×Pc+(1−w)×Pr. (6)
With rearrangement of the equation, we get the weight w of construction materials:
w = (Ph−Pr)(Pc−Pr)−1. (7)
Then we can calculate the expenditure on construction materials with the weight . When
there are n subcategories, we need at least n-1 observations to estimate the weights, and
assume that the weights are stable in the n-1 years. We successfully estimate the weights
for most cases. There are few occasions that the calculated weights are not consistent.
In such cases, we estimate the weights by linear interpolation.
For the rural residents’ durable consumption, we use price index of all households to
estimate the weight of urban residents’ expenditure, wu, and rural residents’ expenditure,
1-wu, for all durables goods. Multiplying the urban residents’ expenditure on durable
goods by (1−wu)/wu, we have the rural residents’ expenditures on those durable goods.
With the CPI index, we convert the durables in current price to constant price of year
2000. For consumer durables before 1981, the data are limited and we cannot have
precise estimation. So we simply assume the share of consumer durables in house-
hold consumption (Ch) increase exponentially from 1952 to 1981. Because the share
of durables in 1981 is already small (less than 2% as of total household consumption
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in constant price of year 2000), the estimation of consumption durables does not make
noticeable changes.
2.3 Stock of Capital (K)
Stock of capital (K) consists of private (non-government) physical capital (K p), govern-
ment physical capital (Kg), stock of consumer durables (Kd). We estimate them by their
laws of motion:
Kt = K pt +Kgt +Kdt ; (8)
K pt+1 = I pt +(1−δp)K pt ; (9)
Kgt+1 = Igt +(1−δg)Kgt ; (10)
Kdt+1 = Idt +(1−δd)K pt ; (11)
where δp, δg and δdare the corresponding depreciation rates. We adopt Chow (1993)’s
estimation of the depreciation rate of physical capital (δp and δg), 0.05, and his estima-
tion of the initial value of capital (K p and Kg) at the end of 1952 including land value,
about 2.7 times of the year 1952’s output. We assume that consumer durables depreciate
faster, and we set at 0.2. The initial value of Kd at the end of year 1952 is assumed 4
times of Id in 1952. Because the consumer durables depreciate faster, the estimation of
the sequence of Kd is not sensitive to the initial value of Kd.
2.4 Values of services from Kg and Kd
Because the official data do not include the return of consumer durables and government
capital, we need to estimate the return values (equivalently values of their service) Y d
and Y g, and add the values into consumption and output. We want a proxy of rate of
return for Kg and Kd. It is intuitive to use the rate of return of K p. We do this in the
following steps. First, we estimate the income share of capital (θp) for K p:
θp = gross return of capital/(Yo− production tax) (12)
Because there is a production tax in addition to capital income and labor income in orig-
inal GDP data, we need to deduct it when we estimate the income share. The necessary
data are available from statistics of flow of funds account (FOF) for the period 1992-
2004 released by NBS. In the second step, we then calculate the net rate of return (r) of
K p:
r = Y kp/K p−δp = θpYo/K p−δp; (13)
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Figure 1: Employment
where Y kp denotes the income of K p. We use r with and to form income shares for
Kg and Kd. Then we calculate the flow of services of government capital (Y g) and
consumer durables (Y d):
Y gt = (rt +δg)Kgt = θpY pt/K pt −δp+δg)Kgt ; (14)
Y dt = (rt +δd)Kdt = θpY pt/K pt −δp+δd)Kdt ; (15)
Employment
We use the data of employment in annual issues of CSY. It is obvious to notice
that there is a jump of employment in 1990, a sudden increase of 942 million workers.
There is no economic reason for this increase (see figure 1). After a contact with China
NSB officials, we found that NSB changed the methodology of data collection from firm
survey to household survey. This change resulted in an inconsistency of the employment
data. To prevent the unreasonable fluctuation, we have to adjust the employment data.
We suppose that the increase in 1990 contains two components: employment growth and
previous under-estimation by the firm survey. We assume that the employment growth
rate is the same as in 1989 to calculate the proportion of previous under-estimation.
Assuming that the gap between firm survey and household survey (in proportion) is
constant over time, we use it to adjust the employment data before 1990.
In addition, we found that the official employment data include some hidden un-
employment. A large number of laid-offs from the state-owned enterprises (SOE) have
been observed since the SOE reform started in 1993. These laid-offs were often paid
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Figure 2: Employment – official and adjusted
by their working units at a minimum living allowance until they found new jobs or re-
tired. They were counted in employment by NSB. This transitional arrangement ended
in 2007 because of the establishment of unemployment insurance. It is necessary to ad-
just the employment during the period 1993 - 2006 to subtract the SOE laid-offs. CLSY
releases the numbers of the SOE laid-offs for the years 1996 through 2006, but figures
from 1993 to 1995 are absent. We assume that China started to accumulate the hid-
den unemployment from 1993, and simply apply the linear interpolation to estimate the
missing laid-off figures between 1993 and 1995. Figure 2 depicts the official and out
adjusted employment.
Hours worked
The data of hours worked are very limited. CLSY releases the surveyed data of
hours worked per worker week in urban areas for the years from 1991 through 1998
and from 2001 through 2006. It provides data for each sector. We use sector shares
in national employment as weighs to compute aggregated weighted hours per worker.
However, these limited observations are not sufficient to perform analysis for the period
1954-2006. Therefore we decide to focus on employment in our analysis in the main
text. However, we apply an econometric method to estimate the average hours worked
for the post-1978 period, and perform the same neo-classical analysis in the appendix
for comparison. We show that, except the labor fluctuation, our analysis results in the
text still hold when we consider the hours worked in the model.
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Figure 3: Deviations from the trend of output
Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
TFP series is calculated by using Solow residuals:
ln(At) = ln(Yt)−θ ln(Kt)− (1−θ)ln(Ht). (16)
To provide consistent comparison between pre-1978 and post-1978 periods, we use em-
ployment to represent labor input H. Hence changes in hours worked will be captured
by the Solow residuals.
3 Stylized Facts
We use H-P filter to remove the growth trends of each variable. Because only annual
data are available in China, as suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002), we set the H-P
filter lambda coefficient as 6.25 so that the statistical features of annual data can be
comparable with quarterly data.9 We present the main features of China’s economic
fluctuations for periods 1954 to 1977 and 1978 to 2006 in this section. The detailed
report is shown by table 14 in the appendix.
9If we do H-P filter with lambda 100 instead of 6.25, the calculated volatility would be much higher
than we present in the paper, but the relative volatility and pattern changes after 1978 would be the same.
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Table 1: Standard deviation from the trend (%)
Variable Pre-1978 Post-1978 Change
Output (Y ) 7.4 1.7 -78
Consumption (Ch+G) 4.2 1.7 -60
Household (Ch) 3.9 1.7 -57
Government (G) 9.1 3.0 -67
Investment (Ip+ IG) 20.3 3.6 -83
Private (non-Govt) (Ip) 27.6 4.6 -83
Government (Ig) 20.9 6.5 -69
Labor* (L) 1.6 0.3 -84
Notes: * Labor is employment only. We also estimate the labor hours
for the post-1978 period with limited data. The volatility of the esti-
mated labor hours is 1.5% in the post-1978 period.
3.1 Economic Fluctuations - Great Moderation after 1978
It is well known that the 1978 reform in China has brought high growth. When we
compare the fluctuations in the pre-1978 and post-1978 periods, it is clear to observe
that the market oriented reform started in 1978 was also accompanied with a sharp
fall in economic volatility. Figure 3 presents output fluctuations in 1954-2006 by H-P
filtered series. The annual output growth rate increases from 6 percent to 9 percent in
the post-1978 period, while its volatility (measured by the standard deviation of the H-P
filtered series) falls by 78%, from 7.4% to 1.7%.
Not only output, in fact, fluctuations of all economic variables, including household
consumption, government consumption, private investment, government investment and
employment, are generally moderated compared with those in the pre-1978 period. The
standard deviation of household consumption drops from 3.9% in the pre-1978 period
to 1.7% in the post-1978 period, output drops from 7.4% to 1.7%, and employment
decreases from 1.6% to 0.3%. The volatility reduction in private investment is even
sharper, from 27.6% to 4.6%. Table 1 presents the general moderation in volatility
clearly.
3.2 Relative Volatility Changes
Although the economic volatility is generally moderated after 1978, the relative volatil-
ity (with respect to output) of each variable diverges. The relative volatility of a variable
is defined as the standard deviation of the variable relative to the standard deviation of
output. If the variable is more volatile than output, its relative volatility will be greater
than one. Table 2 reports the relative volatility of each variable and a comparison be-
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Table 2: Standard deviation relative to output (%)
Variable Pre-1978 Post-1978
Output (Y ) 100 100
Consumption (Ch+G) 55 102
Household (Ch) 53 103
Government (G) 121 182
Investment (Ip+ Ig) 276 217
Private (non-Govt) (Ip) 375 277
Government (IG) 278 395
Labor* (L) 22 16
Notes: * Labor is employment only.
tween the pre-1978 and post-1978 period. We can observe that the relative volatility
of household consumption increases from 0.53 (less volatile than output) to 1.03 (more
volatile than output), while the private investment falls from 3.8 to 2.8.
3.3 World Comparison
We also compare the business cycle features of China with other economies. Chinese
economy in the pre-1978 period is excessively volatile compared with other countries,
both the developed and the developing (See table 3). Nevertheless, its economic volatil-
ity in the post-1978 period does not differ from other economies too much. China’s
output volatility in the post-1978 period is comparable with the UK and the US; the
volatility of household consumption is a bit higher than other economies but not far
from the UK; investment in China is less volatile than many countries and similar to
India and Malaysia. China stands out in volatility of government consumption and is
similar to Pakistan. Table 3 presents the comparison. In general, after China opened up
its economy and started the market-oriented reform in 1978, its business cycle features
became comparable with the rest of world.
3.4 Discussion
It is natural to ask why the volatility reduction go along with the development of markets.
We can view the introduction of price mechanism as a new technology adopted in China
that can guide resource allocation more efficiently and quickly. In a centrally-planed
economy, misallocation is usually realized when it becomes very obvious, and then
necessary adjustment comes too late to prevent worsened situations. This is basically
what happened during the “Great Leap Forward” and the “Cultural Revolution” in the
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Table 3: World Comparison (%)
Country Y Ch G I
Asian countries
India 1.12 0.91 1.08 3.34
Korea 1.50 1.42 1.30 5.56
Malaysia 0.88 1.27 1.50 3.28
Developed countries
Canada 1.56 1.22 0.88 6.40
France 0.96 0.82 0.75 5.21
Japan 1.39 1.26 1.23 4.29
UK 1.72 1.88 0.91 7.41
USA 1.73 1.41 0.66 6.68
China (1954-1977) 7.36 3.92 9.10 27.59
China (1978-2006) 1.65 1.70 3.00 4.57
Notes: Numbers for countries other than China are from Rand
and Tarp (2002) and calculated from data for the period 1970-
97.
pre-1978 period in China. Therefore, it is intuitive to expect that China’s technology or
TFP process would reflect this progress and moderate the economic volatility. To better
understand how the technology change can affect China’s economic fluctuations, we use
a neo-classical approach to provide further analysis.
4 Analysis I – Growth model with TFP shocks
We start with a standard neo-classical model with population growth, productivity growth,
and TFP shocks. In this baseline model, the TFP process is the main factor for explain-
ing economic fluctuations. We construct two separate economies for the pre-1978 and
the post-1978 periods. They share the same model structure, but differ from each other
in population growth, productivity growth, and TFP process.
4.1 The Model
The economy is populated by a large number, Nt , of agents at time t. The population
grows at a constant rate η−1. Each individual is endowed an unit of time, which can be
spent on leisure or working, in each period. The technology for production is assumed
as Cobb-Douglas type with stochastic TFP shocks. We also assume a constant produc-
tivity growth for production with the growth rate g− 1. In this economy, the social
planner’s problem is to maximize the lifetime discounted aggregate utility by choosing
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representative consumption ct , investment it , and labor supply ht in each period:
max
{ct ,it ,ht}∞t=0
E0
{
∞
∑
t=0
β tNt [ln(ct)+α ln(ht)]
}
(17)
subject to
Yt = ezt (Kt)θ (gtHt)1−θ ; (18)
Ct + It = Yt ; (19)
Kt+1 = (1−δ )Kt + It ; K0 given; (20)
Nt+1 = ηNt ; (21)
zt = ρzzt−1+ εt ; (22)
where Ct = Ntct , Kt = Ntkt , It = Nt it and Ht = Ntht . Nt is the working-age population
at time t and grows at η . Ct , Kt , It and Ht are aggregate consumption, aggregate capital
stock, aggregate investment and aggregate labor supply at time t, respectively. zt is a
stochastic productivity shock which follows an AR(1) process, and εt is a white nose
with mean zero and standard deviation σε .
4.2 Calibration
Following the methodology that was introduced by Cooley and Prescott (1995), we
calibrate the preference and production parameters by using the data of 1978–2006 when
Chinese economy is more market-oriented and less distorted. Parameters of growth and
TFP process are calibrated separately for the pre-1978 and the post-1978 periods. The
basic rule of our calibration is that we select the parameters so that properties of the
balanced growth path of the model economy can match certain long-term features of the
real economy.
Growth and Shocks
The population growth η is calculated from the average of growth of adult population
in China. The productivity growth g is selected so that the per capita output growth in
the model can match the per capita GDP growth in the data.
We use an AR(1) process as equation (22) to approximate the TFP shock process
z. Literature has suggested that z is highly persistent. We follow Hasen (1985) and set
the persistence ρz at 0.95. Based on this setting, our estimation shows that the standard
deviation of the disturbance ε is 0.105 in the pre-1978 period and is reduced to 0.025 on
average after 1978.
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Table 4: Model Parameters 1
Parameter (1954-1977) (1978-2006)
Growth
η 1.0194 1.0152
g 1.0322 1.0607
Shocks
σz 0.105 0.025
Note: η – average population growth; g – per-capita
GDP growth; σz – standard deviation of TFP shock
process.
Table 5: Model Parameters 2
Parameter (1954-1977) (1978-2006)
Preference
β 0.955 0.955
α 1.443 1.443
Production
δ 0.0545 0.0545
θ 0.456 0.456
Shock persistence
ρz 0.95 0.95
Note: These parameters are invariant in both economies for the
pre-1978 and the post-1978 periods.
Preference
We assume that preferences do not change over time. The utility discount parameter has
the following property from the first order conditions:
β =
g
θ(y¯/k¯)+1−δ ; (23)
where y¯ is per capita output and k¯ is per capita capital in the non-stochastic steady state
of the model. Given that the average capital-output ratio is 2.768 in the data, we have
that β = 0.955.
Also from the first order conditions, the leisure utility parameter α can also be ex-
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Table 6: Simulation results – Standard deviation from trend (%)
Data Model
Variable Pre-78 Post-78 change Pre-78 Post-78 change
C 4.1 1.7 -59 3.4 0.9 -74
(Household C) (3.9) (1.7)
I 20.3 3.6 -82 16.0 3.6 -77
(Private I) (27.6) (4.6)
L 1.6 0.3 -84 2.8 0.6 -77
Y 7.4 1.7 -78 7.7 1.8 -76
Notes: C – aggregate consumption; I – aggregate investment; L – labor; Y – output.
Labor L is approximated by employment.
pressed as follows:
α =
(1−θ)(1/h¯−1)
1+(1−δ −ηg)(k¯/y¯) ; (24)
where h¯ denotes the hours worked in the steady state. We assume that an agent is
endowed 16 hours per day for working and leisure and normalize the time endowment
to one in the model. In the data the average hours worked are 2172 hours per worker per
year that yields the value 0.372 for the h¯. Then we can calculate the above equation and
have α = 1.443.
Production
We have estimated the returns of non-government physical capital, government capital
and consumer durables (θpY p, Yg and Yd , respectively). The aggregate capital income
share θ can be simply calculated as follows:
θ = (θpY p+Yg+Yd)/Y ; (25)
where Y is the adjusted total output. We find that the capital share is stable during 1992
– 2004, and use the average 0.456 for θ . Hence the labor income share is 0.544. We
also used a restricted regression to estimate the factor income share of the production
function in the post 1978 period and found a similar result.
The parameters are summarized in table 4 and table 5.
4.3 Model solution and quantitative analysis
To solve the model, we apply Uhlig’s toolkit, which is widely used for analyzing nonlin-
ear dynamic discrete-time stochastic models. The toolkit provides a device for solving
17
such models easily. The general procedure is first log-linearizing the necessary equa-
tions that characterize the equilibrium, and then solving for the recursive equilibrium
law of motion with the method of undetermined coefficients. Please see detailed infor-
mation provided in Uhlig (1999).
With the approximated law of motion solved from the model, we do simulations
and calculate the moments of each variable for analysis. Table 6 shows the standard
deviations of each variable from model simulations and from the data. We find that the
simple model successfully generates the big moderation on fluctuations after the 1978
reform. The deviations generated by the model are also close to the data in general.
With the simple and standard settings, we are surprised by the model’s performance.
However, if we take a closer look, the magnitude of some variables’ volatility does not
match the data very well. The volatility of C is lower than the data: 4.1% and 1.7% for
the pre-1978 and the post-1978, respectively, in the data versus 3.4% and 0.9% in the
model. The volatility of I is also lower than the data: 20.3% and 3.6% in the data versus
16% and 3.6% in the model. The private investment even has a higher volatility: 28.5%
and 4.4% for the pre-1978 and the post-1978, respectively.
Moreover, if we look at the relative volatility changes, we find a significant differ-
ence between the model and the data. Relative volatility of variable x (to output) is
defined as the standard deviation of x as of a percentage of the standard deviation of
output Y . Table 7 presents the comparison clearly. In the model, although the econ-
omy indeed becomes less volatile in the post-1978 period as the data show, volatility of
each variable is moderated by a similar proportion and so the relative volatilities in both
the pre-1978 and the post-1978 are very similar. In the data, the relative volatility of
each variable actually shows a diverge trend. As we mentioned in section 3.2, the rela-
tive volatility of household consumption increases from 53% to 103% in the post-1978
period while the private investment falls from 375% to 277%.
5 Analysis II – Government Expenditure Shocks
Our experiment shows that the standard growth model with TFP shocks can not match
the magnitude of volatility in consumption and investment very, and fails to explain
the relative volatility changes. It is natural to ask what factor(s) additional to the TFP
can explain those facts. We suggest that Chinese government might play an important
role for further understanding the economic fluctuations. This suggestion is based on
the facts that the economy was centrally-planned until 1978 and the direct government
expenditure was constantly around 20% of its GDP in both pre-1978 and post-1978 peri-
ods. To examine this point, we extend the model to incorporate government expenditure,
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Table 7: Relative volatility to output (%)
Data Model
Variable Pre-78 Post-78 Pre-78 Post-78
C 55 102 44 47
(Household C) 53 103
I 276 217 208 197
(Private I) 375 277
L 22 16 37 35
Y 100 100 100 100
Notes: Notes: C – aggregate consumption; I – aggregate
investment; L – labor; Y – output. Labor L is approximated
by employment.
which consists of government consumption G and government investment IG. They are
modeled as shocks to households in the economy. Now the constraints to the planner
who tries to maximize the aggregate welfare (as equation (17) described) become:
Ct + It + IGt +Gt = Yt ; (26)
Kt+1 = (1−δ )Kt + It + IGt ; (27)
Nt+1 = ηNt ; (28)
Yt = ezt (Kt)θ (gtHt)1−θ ; (29)
Gt = G¯(ηg)tezGt ; (30)
IGt = I¯G(ηg)tezIGt ; (31)
zt = ρzt−1+ εt ; (32)
zGt = ρgzGt−1 +(ρzG)zt−1+ εGt ; (33)
zIGt = ρIGzIGt−1 +(ρzIG)zt−1+ εIGt ; (34)
Equation (30) describes the law of motion of G, which consists of a constant com-
ponent G¯, a growth component (ηg)t and a stochastic shock component ezGt . Equation
(31) is the law of motion of IG, which has the same constructer as G. We assume G
and IG grow with the economy. The growth rates are the same as the output’s rate. On
the non-stochastic balanced growth path, the G/Y and the IG/Y ratios are constant and
denoted by τG and τIG , respectively. The shock components of government consumption
and government investment, zG and zIG , follow the processes as described by equation
(33) and (34), where εGt and εIGt are white-noise and i.i.d. disturbances with standard
deviation σG and σIG, respectively.
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Table 8: Estimation results of government shocks I
Gov’t consumption Gov’t investment
Period σG τG σIG τIG
pre-1978 0.089 7.8% 0.173 11.7%
post-1978 0.037 11.9% 0.081 6.8%
Table 9: Estimation results of government shocks II
Gov’t consumption Gov’t investment
Period ρg ρzG ρIG ρzIG
pre-1978 -0.12 0.74∗∗∗ -0.26 2.04∗∗∗
post-1978 0.39∗∗ −0.58∗ 0.17 -0.61
Notes:Estimated by three-stage regressions. * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
5.1 Estimation of Government Shock Processes
We use long-term averages on the G/Y and the IG/Y ratios for the values of τG and τIG in
the pre-1978 and the post-1978 periods. We can observe the changes in the expenditure
allocation: Government consumption’s share in output increased from 8% to 12%, while
Government investment’s share in output decreased from 12% to 7% (see table 8).
We use de-trended sequences of log(G) and log(IG) from the data for the estimation
of zG and zIG processes.
10 We adopt three-stage least square regressions to reduce the
endogeneity problem. The estimated coefficients are robust to various model specifica-
tions. The estimation results are not significantly different from the results delivered by
other methods such as ordinary least square and seemingly-unrelated regressions. Ta-
ble 9 present the results. We can observe that government consumption changes from
pro-cyclical before 1978 to counter-cyclical after 1978. ρzG measures how the govern-
ment consumption responses to TFP shocks, and its value is 0.74 in the pre-1978 period
but becomes -0.58 in the post-1978 period. A similar pattern is also observed in the
government investment. The value of ρzIG switches from 2.04 to -0.61. The values of
10From equation (30) and (31), we can have:
log(Gt) = log(G¯)+ t log(ηg)+ zGt ;
log(IGt) = log( ¯IG)+ t log(ηg)+ zIGt .
20
Table 10: Simulation results – Standard deviation from trend (%)
Data Model 1 Model 2 (with G&IG)
Var pre-78 post-78 change pre-78 post-78 pre-78 post-78 change
C 3.9 1.7 -57 3.4 0.9 4.1 1.2 -67
I 27.6 4.6 -83 16.0 3.6 20.3 4.0 -84
L 1.6 0.3 -84 2.8 0.6 1.6 0.3 -88
Y 7.4 1.7 -78 7.7 1.8 7.3 1.7 -78
Notes: C of the data is household consumption. I of the data is the private (non-government)
investment. Labor L of the data is employment.
parameter σG and σIG are selected so that the standard deviations of zG and zIG are equal
to the data. We can see that the volatility of government expenditure is also decreased
in the post-1978 period (see table 8).
In sum, we find that the government expenditure becomes less volatile, switches
from pro-cyclical to counter-cyclical, and is allocated more on government consumption
rather than government investment in the post-1978 period.
5.2 Quantitative Results
We use the same method to solve the model with government expenditure shocks and
perform quantitative analysis. As in the baseline model, we simulate the model economy
and compare it with the data. Table 10’s columns under ‘Model 2’ show the volatility
of each variable in the model economies and the changes from the pre-1978 to the post-
1978. We observe that the extended model can still generate the general moderation on
economic fluctuations after 1978 as that we observed from the data. Compared with the
baseline model (columns under ‘Model 1’), we can find that the values of volatility of C
and I are closer to the data with the addition of government expenditure.11
Table 11 presents the relative volatility in the data and model economies. As we
mentioned, the baseline model can not explain the divergent relative volatility changes
from the pre-1978 to the post-1978 (see columns under ‘Data’ and ‘Model 1’). With tak-
ing into account the government expenditure shocks, the model performance is largely
improved. The simulated economy (columns under ‘Model 2’) also shows a divergency
in relative volatility – an increase in consumption’s relative volatility (from 48% to 71%)
and a decrease in investment’s relative volatility (from 342% to 242%).
11Because we have government consumption (G) and investment (IG) in the model, for C, we compare
the values in the model economies with household consumption of the data; for I, we compare the model
values with the private (non-government) investment of the data.
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Table 11: Simulation results – Relative volatility (%)
Data Model 1 Model 2 (with G&IG)
Variable Pre-78 Post-78 Pre-78 Post-78 Pre-78 Post-78
C 53 103 44 47 48 71
I 375 277 208 197 342 242
L 22 16 37 35 30 16
Y 100 100 100 100 100 100
Notes: C of the data is household consumption. I of the data is the private (non-
government) investment. Labor L of the data is employment.
Responses to the real shocks
We also simulate the model economy with real shocks (TFP and government ex-
penditures) that are computed from the data. Responses to the shocks in the model are
compared with the data and shown in figure 4. The output fluctuations in the model
are very close to those observed in the data. The famous historical event “Great Leap
Forward,” which brought a sudden and sharp increase in the investment, and the follow-
ing up disaster “Great Chinese Famine,” which resulted in millions of deaths, happened
between 1958 and 1961.12 These events are likely the reason for that the model does
less well on consumption and investment fluctuations during this time period. We also
observe that the model matches employment fluctuations less well compared with other
variables.
5.3 Discussion – the effects of government expenditures
The quantitative analysis has shown that the government expenditure processes improve
the model’s performance and explains a large part of the relative volatility changes from
the pre-1978 period to the post-1978 period. To understand the mechanism, let us use a
case of a bad productivity shock to illustrate.
Suppose that a bad TFP shock happens at current period (z drops). The direct effect
is that output Y , labor input L, consumption C and investment I will all decrease. In
the post-1978 period, since the government expenditures have been counter-cyclical,
G and IG are expected to increase. The increase in G is a negative income shock to
12The Great Leap Forward is an economic and social plan used from 1958 to 1961 which aimed to
use China’s vast population to rapidly transform China from a primarily agrarian economy into a modern
communist society. The fail of the Great Leap Forward followed with the Great Chinese Famine, officially
referred to as the Three Years of Natural Disasters. According to government statistics, there were 15
million excess deaths in this period. Unofficial estimates are even higher.
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Figure 4: Responses to real shocks: deviation from the trend
households, and so household will save more (increase I), consume even less (decrease
C) and work more (increase L). Therefore, the response to the future increase in G
reduces the negative effects on I and L caused by the bad TFP shock, but worsens the
negative effect on C.
The same mechanism applies to a case with a positive shock. Counter-cyclical G is
expected to decrease. It is a positive income effect that encourages more consumption
and reduces savings and labor supply. Figure 5 and 6 present the impulse responses to a
positive TFP shock in the pre-1978 model economy and the post-1978 model economy,
respectively.
Compared with the pre-1978 period, the pattern change in G process makes con-
sumption more volatile in the post-1978 period because it reinforces consumption’s
fluctuations with TFP shocks, but it moderates the volatility of investment, labor input.
Because the fluctuations of factor inputs are moderated, output volatility is also reduced
in the post-1978 but the reduction is smaller than it on factor inputs. This mechanism
gives an explanation of why consumption becomes more volatile relative to output while
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Figure 5: Impulse responses to a positive TFP shock (pre-1978)
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Figure 6: Impulse responses to a positive TFP shock (post-1978)
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investment becomes relatively less volatile in the post-1978.
The government investment IG in the model only has a crowding-out effect on pri-
vate Investment. It makes private investment more volatile in both pre-1978 and post-
1978 periods that helps the model to match the magnitude of investment volatility in the
data.
In addition, the fact that Chinese government re-allocates more spendings on G from
IG in the post-1978 period also strengthens the effects of the counter-cyclical G process.
6 Counterfactual Experiments
In the model, we take into account four factors that drive the changes from the pre-1978
period to the post-1978 period. They are two growth factors – population growth, tech-
nology growth, and two shock processes – TFP and government expenditure (including
G and IG). To disentangle the effects of these factors, we perform several counterfactual
experiments. In each experiment, we do the same simulation as we did with the extended
model for the pre-1978 economy, but in the post-1978 economy we only allow one fac-
tor to change and keep all other factors the same as in the pre-1978 economy. Table 12
summarizes the experiment results. The first column shows the volatility changes from
the pre-1978 to the post-1978 in the data. Column 2 – 4 present the four counterfactual
experiments. The last column shows the volatility changes with taking into account all
the four factors in the model.
The results suggest that the moderation in economic volatility is mainly explained
by the TFP process. However, it cannot explain the relative changes in volatility (see
the fourth column in table 12). It generates more reduction in the consumption than in
the investment that is contrary to what we observe in the data. In the 5th column we
can see how government fiscal policy changes affect the economic fluctuations. The
pattern change from pro-cyclical to counter-cyclical policies reduces the volatility in the
investment, the employment and the output, but increases the volatility of consumption.
Although itself can not explain the main changes after 1978, it provides an explanation
to the relative volatility changes. We also observe that growth factors play a minor role
in explaining the economic fluctuations.
7 Conclusion
This paper has studied the economic fluctuations in China and presented the features
of Chinese real business cycles between 1954 and 2006. We have also examined the
changes after 1978 when China started its market-oriented economic reforms. It is
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Table 12: Counterfactual experiment: volatility changes after 1978 (%)
Data Counterfactual experiment Model 2
η growth g growth TFP process Fiscal policies
C -56.63 -0.86 6.29 -75.43 28.00 -66.86
I -83.44 1.75 -10.01 -59.61 -36.22 -84.23
L -84.15 1.35 -9.87 -75.34 -42.60 -87.89
Y -77.58 0.41 -2.04 -75.51 -7.62 -77.69
Notes: C of the data is household consumption. I of the data is the private (non-
government) investment. Labor L of the data is employment.
well known that this structural change led to a significant improvement on economic
growth. Our study shows that the economic fluctuations were also largely moderated
in the period between 1978 and 2006. We also find that the magnitude of the volatility
reduction in each economic variable diverges - consumption relative to output became
more volatile while investment relative to output became less volatile compared with the
period before 1978.
To further understand the factors that can account for the fluctuation features in
China, we perform several theoretical and quantitative analyses. We first use a standard
neoclassical growth model with TFP shocks and show it can explan the main features of
fluctuations in the Chinese economy. We find that the simple model not only can match
the business cycle features in the market-oriented period (1978-2006), but also performs
well in explaining the fluctuations during the centrally-planned period (1954-1977). The
great volatility moderation in the post-1978 period is also successfully generated in the
model economy. However, the model cannot explain the relative volatility changes well.
It predicts similar figures of relative volatility for both periods that is not consistent with
the data in which the relative volatility changes between the pre-1978 and the post-1978
periods, and the change diverges with each variable.
We suggest that the process of government expenditure can account for the relative
volatility divergence. Our study shows that there is a policy change from a pro-cyclical
policy in the pre-1978 period to a counter-cyclical policy in the post-1978 period. We
also find that the expenditure allocation between government consumption and govern-
ment investment is reversed in the post-1978 period. The government consumption be-
comes the major expenditure after 1978. We then incorporate the government consump-
tion and government investment processes into the model and perform a quantitative
analysis. Our simulation results show that the counter-cyclical government consump-
tion process further moderates the fluctuations of investment, employment and output,
but it increases the volatility of consumption in the post-1978 period. The expenditure
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allocation change further strengthens the effects that provide an explanation to the rela-
tive volatility changes. The government investment process does not affect the relative
volatility but improves the model in matching the magnitude of the volatility.
We also provide counterfactual experiments to examine the role of each factor for
the changes in economic fluctuations from the pre-1978 to the post-1978. We take
into account two growth factors, population and productivity growth, and two shock
processes, TFP and government expenditure, for driving the differences between the
two periods. The experiment results suggest the TFP process as the main reason for the
general moderation in economic volatility, but also indicates that the relative changes in
volatility can not be generated only by the TFP process. The government expenditure
process gives an explanation to the relative volatility changes.
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Figure 7: Estimated hours worked, 1978 – 2006
Appendix
Analysis with Estimated Labor Hours
As we mentioned in the data part, the data of hours worked are very limited. Only
observations in urban area between 1991 – 1998 and between 2001 – 2006 are avail-
able. To estimate hours worked in the post-1978 period (1978 – 2006), we assume that
logarithm of hours worked per worker is a function of GDP real growth rate, logarithm
of non-agriculture employment and real growth of wage. We use a regression to esti-
mate the function with the available data, and then use this function to predict hours per
worker for years 1978 – 1990, 1999 and 2000. For the period prior to 1978, China was a
centrally-planned economy, and the hours were also supposed to be planned. With cur-
rently available data, we are not able to estimate the actual hours worked in the pr-1978
period. Figure 7 presents the estimated hours worked in the post-1978 period. We find
that the cut of legal working days from 6 days per week to 5 days per week in 1995 does
not affect the total hours worked significantly.
With the estimated hours worked, we recalculate the labor input and TFP process.
The estimated labor hours are much more volatile than the employment. The standard
deviation from its trend is 1.53% compared with the 0.27% of the employment. We
then perform the same analysis as we did in the section 5 with the model in which the
government expenditure is characterized. The results are listed in table 13. We can see
that our previous simulation results are still valid with the estimated labor hours and the
corresponding TFP process. However, the estimated labor hours are more volatile and
the model can not generate a comparable labor volatility. One reason could be the data
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Table 13: Simulation with labor hours, post-1978 (%)
Data Model 2
SD Relative SD SD Relative SD
C 1.70 103 1.18 72
I 4.57 277 3.97 241
L 1.53 (0.27) 92 (16) 0.27 16
Y 1.65 100 1.65 100
Notes: C of the data is household consumption. I of the data is
the private (non-government) investment. Labor L of the data is
estimated labor hours. In parenthesis is employment volatility.
problem since we use limited observations to estimate the hours worked in the whole
post-1978 period. Another reason might be that some institutional changes in China’s
labor market are not characterized in the model. For example, reforms of state-owned
enterprisers (SOEs), reforms of labor laws and other changes in institutional factors
are all likely to affect the labor demand and supply. It still needs further research to
better understand the institutional changes in the labor market and the effects on labor
volatility.
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Table 14: Standard deviation and correlation with output
Variable Volatility Cross correlation of GNPS with
(SD, % ) x(−1) x x(+1)
Before 1978 (1954-1977)
Output
GDP (GNP) 7.6 0.40 1.00 0.37
GNPS 7.4 0.38 1.00 0.39
Consumption
CNDSG 3.9 0.33 0.93 0.33
CONS 3.2 0.51 0.76 0.05
CNDS 4.0 0.44 0.93 0.24
GOVT 9.1 -0.19 0.59 0.49
Investment
INV 20.8 0.37 0.97 0.44
INVD 20.7 0.37 0.97 0.44
INVG 20.9 0.23 0.91 0.38
INVP 27.6 0.42 0.83 0.42
Labor
EMP 1.6 0.56 0.54 0.08
After 1978 (1978-2004)
Output
GDP 1.7 0.46 0.93 0.43
GNP 1.6 0.50 0.98 0.40
GNPS 1.6 0.48 1.00 0.42
Consumption
CNDSG 1.7 0.51 0.71 0.12
CONS 1.9 0.39 0.63 0.14
CNDS 1.7 0.44 0.70 0.15
GOVT 3.0 0.50 0.44 -0.03
Investment
INV 3.4 0.18 0.66 0.41
INVD 3.6 0.21 0.75 0.44
INVG 6.5 0.12 0.17 -0.06
INVP 4.6 -0.03 0.40 0.50
Labor
EMP 0.3 -0.31 -0.28 -0.13
HOURS* 1.5 0.25 -0.01 -0.56
Note: GNPS – GNP including service of durables and service of government
capital; CNDSG – household consumption plus service of durables and of
government capital; CONS–household consumption expenditure; CNDS –
household consumption of nondurables and services; GOVT – government
consumption; INV – investment including net exports; INVD – INV plus
consumer durable expenditure; INVG – government investment; INVP –
private investment plus consumer durable expenditure; EMP – employment;
HOURS – total labor hours (employment times average hours worked). *Es-
timated. The data of hours worked are only available for few years in the
post-1978 period.
31
